NEVADA OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW BOARD

2

1

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

1415

16

17

18

1920

21

22

23

25

24

26

27

28


CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER
OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, DIVISION
OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND
INDUSTRY, STATE OF NEVADA,

Complainant,

Vs.

DILLARDS, INC.,

Respondent.



Docket No. LV 14-1703

DECISION

This matter came before the NEVADA OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH **REVIEW BOARD** at a hearing commenced on the $14^{\rm th}$ day of August, 2014, in furtherance of notice duly provided according to law. MS. SALLI ORTIZ, ESQ., counsel appearing on behalf of the Complainant. Chief Administrative Officer of the Occupational Safety Administration, Division of Industrial Relations (OSHA). MR. TIMOTHY E. ROWE, ESQ., counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent, Dillards, Inc.

Jurisdiction in this matter has been conferred in accordance with Nevada Revised Statute 618.315.

The complaint filed by the OSHA sets forth allegations of violation of Nevada Revised Statutes as referenced in Exhibit "A", attached thereto.

Citation 1, Item 1, charged a violation of 29 CFR 1910.305(b)(2)(i), which provides in pertinent part:

All pull boxes, junction boxes, and fittings shall be provided with covers identified for the purpose.

If metal covers are used, they shall be grounded. In completed installations, each outlet box shall have a cover, faceplate, or fixture canopy. Covers of outlet boxes having holes through which flexible cord pendants pass shall be provided with bushings designated for the purpose or shall have smooth, well-rounded surfaces on which the cords may bear.

The complainant alleged that on October 14, 2013 employees in the women's shoe department office area were not protected from inadvertent contact with live wires at over a nominal 50 volts. The wires were housed in junction boxes that had not been covered and located directly next to filing cabinets exposing any employee using the cabinets to potential serious injury due to hazardous conditions, including electrical burns and shock. The violation was classified as serious. The proposed penalty for the violation was \$4,050.00.

Citation 2, Item 1, charged a violation of 29 CFR 1904.32(a)(1), which provides in pertinent part:

OSHA 300 Log Basic Requirement. At the end of each calendar year, each employer must review the OSHA 300 Log to verify that the entries are complete and accurate, and correct any deficiencies identified:

The complainant alleged the employer did not verify that the entries were complete and accurate, as required by the standard. The violation was classified as "other than serious". The proposed penalty for the violation was \$2,430.00.

Citation 2, Item 2, charged a violation of 29 CFR 1904.40(a), which provides in pertinent part:

Basic requirement. When an authorized government representative asks for the records you keep under Part 1904, you must provide copies of the records within four (4) business hours.

The complainant alleged the employer did not supply records in a timely manner, as required by the standard. The violation was

1 2

classified as "other than serious". The proposed penalty for the violation is in the amount of \$810.00.

The parties stipulated to the admission of evidence identified as complainant's Exhibits 1 through 4 containing counsel identified redactions. CHECK TRANSCRIPT FOR ADMITTED REDACTION AGENDA

Complainant and respondent provided brief opening statements.

Complainant referenced the matter as principally involving a "records" case at Citations 2, Items 1 and 2. Respondent was cited for lack of verification of entries in OSHA 300 logs and failure to provide the logs in a timely manner as required by the cited standards. The violations were both classified as "other than serious" (other) and the penalties proposed at \$2,430.00 and \$810.00, respectively. Counsel asserted the respondent claims it is exempt from the provisions based upon a technical argument that it was incorrectly classified as a department store under the OSHA record keeping standards. Complainant intends to prove that Dillards was correctly classified as a department store and not exempt as asserted in its defense.

The violation charged at Citation 1, Item 1, is based upon uncovered electrical junction boxes in an employee work area exposing individuals to accidental contact with live wires carrying over a nominal 50 volts. The violation is classified as serious and a penalty proposed in the amount of \$4,050.00.

Respondent provided an opening statement asserting the respondent was not required to maintain the logs as cited by the complainant in Citation 2, Items 1 and 2. The department store classification for the Dillards Henderson store has not previously been applied to the respondent in the state of Nevada. Interpretation of the identified standard in other states does not classify Dillards a "department store"

due to the limited merchandise available for the reason that each store is "site specific" as to the merchandise carried as inventory for sale.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Counsel for complainant presented testimonial and documentary evidence through witness Mr. Ruben White, a Compliance Safety and Health Officer (CSHO). Mr. White referenced complainant's Exhibits 1 through 4 as stipulated in evidence. He testified in accordance with his inspection and safety narrative report at Exhibit 1, pages 24 through On or about October 14, 2013 CSHO White was assigned the subject investigation based upon an anonymous complaint. During the "walkaround" inspection, CSHO White observed two open electrical junction boxes containing wires he confirmed to carry over 50 volts located in the office area of the women's shoe section directly adjacent to filing cabinets. He determined the area was used by employees on a daily basis for computing tasks, as well as making labels for the products stored in the women's shoe department stock room. He testified Mr. Thomas Estrada, the women's shoe manager, informed him the junction boxes had not been covered for the entire one year period he has been employed at the Dillards location. Mr. Estrada further stated he had spent an hour or two in the area on most days. Interviewed employee number 3 informed CSHO White that she is not in the area very often but occasionally uses the label maker to print labels for products. CSHO White confirmed the label maker and associated materials were in the same vicinity as the uncovered junction boxes containing the live wires carrying over 50 volts.

CSHO White informed store manager Ms. Melody Walker of the violative condition; and she informed him they would be covered immediately. On a follow on visit to the site CSHO White confirmed the junction boxes had been covered with appropriate closures.

1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 5 | k | 6 | 0 | 0

and adjacent to filing cabinets at a level which could easily permit accidental employee contact with the wires in the open box. Mr. White identified the photographs at Exhibit 1, pages 65 and 65A depicting the boxes and wires located inside. He explained photograph 66B as depicting a test light establishing the wires to be "live" carrying over 50 volts.

CSHO White testified the open junction boxes were in "plain view"

On cross-examination by respondent counsel, Mr. White testified the wires were inside the box enclosure and not "sticking out". He observed no exposed "copper" and testified the bare wires were covered by sheathing and "wire nuts".

In response to continued questioning, CSHO White testified the National Electric Code provides that wire sheathing does not protect individuals from shock. Only a cover can satisfy the protection requirements under the Uniform Electrical Code and the requirements of the OSHA standard. CSHO White further testified he was not informed anyone had ever been shocked by the subject wires in the store nor had there been any complaints with regard to same.

On re-direct examination, CSHO White testified as to the hazard exposures identified and employee access to the hazardous conditions. He explained his worksheet (OSHA 1B) penalty calculations, ratings, adjustment factors, and monetary assessment rendered in accordance with the Nevada Operations Manual.

Mr. White continued his direct testimony with regard to Citation 2, Items 1 and 2. He testified that during the "walkaround" he inspected each storage room and documented the conditions observed in accordance with initial complaints which initiated the OSHA investigation. He additionally requested, ". . . as a regular part of

any investigation, the OSHA 300 and 300A logs in furtherance of the typical request letter sent to the respondent . . .". He received the 300 logs for the location but did not receive the 300A portion. He made a follow up request to Ms. Walker who then referred him to Ms. Rhonda Garland, the safety representative for Dillards. Mr. White spoke with Ms. Garland and made the same request of her but was told she believed his area of concern regarding the logs had been subject of a ". . . misclassification under SIC code 5311 . . .". Ms. Garland further informed him that code reference applied to department stores, but the Dillards Henderson facility should appropriately be classified as SIC code 5600 applying to apparel stores; and therefore respondent exempt from the requirement to maintain and/or furnish logs.

CSHO White referenced his narrative report in evidence at page 26 providing the details of his reported findings based upon the discussions with Ms. Garland. He testified Ms. Garland also informed him she had discussions on the subject issue on an earlier date with another CSHO in the OSHA main office, Mr. Shete. She referenced an email communication with Mr. Shete as confirming Dillards had been misclassified at that time and the error corrected.

After researching the SIC codes under the current classification, and that referenced by Ms. Garland, Mr. White testified he concluded the respondent was appropriately classified as a 5311 "department store". Mr. White reviewed the information received from the respondent with his supervisor and it was determined that Dillards is a department store, as opposed to an apparel store, and appropriately classified under the SIC code which results in Dillards not being exempt from enforcement of the standards referenced and cited at Citation 2.

Mr. White referenced and testified from his narrative report that

the 300 logs requested for 2010, 2011 and 2012 were provided and reviewed, but found deficient in what he described as "column F". He explained that for all three years, the injuries and the body parts affected were recorded, but did not include the item or substance that caused the illness or injury.

Mr. White conducted the closing conference on about October 8, 2013 with store manager Ms. Melody Walker. He reported the results of the OSHA inspection, the observed hazards, standard violations found and the abatement requirements.

CSHO White continued testimony responding to questions on the applicability of the Citation 2 standards to the facts found during the inspection and through researching the issues for compliance. He described his classification of "other" as based upon the record keeping nature of the violations and no probability of death or serious physical injury for the violative conduct.

Respondent counsel conducted cross-examination on the Citation 2, Items 1 and 2 alleged violations. Mr. White testified there are exemptions from compliance with the standard and explained the basis for same when certain businesses are involved in "low hazard" activity. He testified that he read the SIC code and concluded that because Dillards sold both housewares and clothing they were appropriately classified by OSHA as a department store rather than an apparel sales operation under the code. He testified the respondent code reference was not considered appropriate nor applicable for an exemption because he observed in plain view products other than apparel for sale in the subject Dillards facility. Mr. White testified he inspected all the stock rooms at the Dillards store and testified on his having observed a variety of items other than apparel held for sale in the facility.

When questioned with regard to safety representative Garland's email exchange and previous understanding, counsel directed the witness attention to complainant's Exhibit 4, commencing at page 99. At page 101 Mr. White responded to questioning as to the retail store classifications under what has been referenced as the IMIS and "SIC" coding for the subject purposes. Mr. White testified the OSHA determination of Dillards classification as a department store was based upon the store carrying ". . . men's and women's apparel and either major household appliances or other home furnishings". Counsel inquired as to the variety of materials located in the facility and Mr. White testified he observed home furnishings and apparel.

On continued cross-examination as to why previous OSHA inspections, including that referenced at Exhibit 4 and the email exchange with safety representative Garland at page 99, OSHA accepted the claim of exemption under the respondent's interpretation of the SIC coding classification, Mr. White responded the current subject investigation was based on his inspection, personal observations, interpretation of the coding, and a revision in OSHA enforcement interpretations. Counsel inquired as to whether OSHA or he advised the respondent that the "law had changed" to which Mr. White responded negatively. He testified that OSHA is not required to inform an employer of the standards because all Nevada employers are expected to inform themselves of any changes or different applications of the governing law.

Complainant counsel presented additional witness testimony from CSHO Edgar Zamora. He testified his duties include a working knowledge and application of SIC codes under the published IMIS references. He confirmed his research on classifications of other stores and various facilities in Nevada and determinations of the applicability and

appropriate enforcement of the Citation 2, Items 1 and 2 requirements on the respondent.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

At the conclusion of complainant's case, the respondent presented witness testimony from department store general manager, Ms. Melody Walker. She testified on the product line in the Henderson Dillards store and described the variety of goods held for sale. She testified the principal products were clothing, accessories, cosmetics, lingerie, linens, shoes, housewares, bedding, bath, china, luggage and some small appliances. She described the percentage of sales as 95% apparel and 5% other which comprised bedding, bath, luggage, and housewares.

At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence and testimony counsel presented closing argument.

Complainant counsel referenced Citation 1, Item 1, regarding the exposure of live electrical wires in the uncovered electrical boxes. She asserted there was no proof requirement the wires must be "sticking out" of the box. The plain meaning of the standard requires an electrical box must be covered. She argued the standard plain meaning of "covered" does not mean wires be only sheathed or connected with wire nuts but rather the box must be covered by the plate component for safety compliance. She argued the photographic exhibits regarding the electrical violations subject to testimony and stipulated evidence, including the voltage testing device, established the live voltage hazard in the wires. Counsel asserted the burden of proof was met with regard to the applicability of the standard, the exposure or access to the recognized hazard by employees working in the immediate area, and employer knowledge particularly after the long-standing violation occurring in plain view. The violative conditions were confirmed in evidence based upon not only the investigative report findings and

photographs but also imputed to respondent by the area supervisor's knowledge and the **obvious** nature of the dangerous violative conditions. It is presumed and subject to lawful inference under occupational safety and health law that a reasonably safety conscious or prudent employer knew or with the exercise of reasonable diligence could have known of an obvious violation in plain view.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

At Citation 2, Item 1, counsel asserted the 300 log requirement was appropriate and Dillards was not exempt. There were 130 employees in the facility. Respondent witness Walker testified under oath and identified items held for sale in the store that were not under any definition "apparel". The standard has no percentage allocation for the type of goods held for sale as a threshold for enforcement. There was no evidence the respondent carried only an apparel line, but wants the SIC code to exempt it from simple compliance with the OSHA 300 log standard. Ms. Walker testified the merchandise in the subject Dillards store had not changed over her many years as manager. The Clark County Business Licensing Division identified the facility as a "department store". Dillards holds itself out to the public as a department store. was simply no evidence, nor could there be an inference, that Dillards falls under an exemption of the SIC codes because the testimony of both complainant and respondent witnesses established ". . . Dillards carries for sale not only apparel but home furnishings as well . . . ". is no requirement that Dillards carry appliances to be classified as a department store. The enforcement standard is applicable if Dillards "carries either appliances or home furnishings". The definition for exemption by use of the word "or" requires Dillards be classified under the department store code by OSHA. There is no exemption from compliance and the plain meaning of the company's described and/or

2

1

3 4

567

8

11 12

13

10

15

16 17

18 19

2021

2223

2425

26

2728

observed merchandise, business and identity, is that it's a department store for code classification and therefore compliance with the cited standards.

At Citation 2, Item 2, counsel asserted that respondent ultimately supplied the records required under the cited standard, but after the expiration of 4 hours. It was therefore untimely and constituted a violation under the specific terms of the standard.

Respondent counsel argued the respondent should not have been ". . . reclassified from its apparel line classification under the SIC enforcement without any notice of a subjected to codes and reinterpretation or change in its previous practice and policy . . . ". Counsel asserted that a simple interpretation of the SIC code terminology at pages 99 and 101, together with the previous OSHA enforcement policy, demonstrates that indeed Dillards was exempt and should continue to be exempt and not found in violation of the cited standards at Citation 2, Items 1 and 2. Counsel asserted at page 101 under the 5311 definition, the store ". . . must carry major appliances and home furnishings to be a 5311 . . . ". He argued there was no evidence the store carried major appliances and therefore should be exempt. Counsel further asserted that regardless of the terminology, the respondent should be classified under the "low risk" category for its predominant apparel line of merchandise because that's the reason behind the code classification process. It is based upon a determination that risk of hazard exposures to employees is "low" in an apparel sales He asserted the testimonial evidence by Ms. Walker was facility. unrebutted that apparel sales are 95% of the business, therefore it is the "primary activity". The definitions at Exhibit 4, page 101, provide major appliances and home furnishings, if there are no

classification as a department store is incorrect and therefore OSHA must rely on the unrefuted "primary activity" evidence to confirm the apparel classification.

Counsel asserted the email exchange referenced at Exhibit 4 between Ms. Garland and OSHA established that two other inspections by Nevada OSHA recognized exemption so why not now; and why wasn't there any "notice" if there was a change in enforcement policy. That kind of conduct is not appropriate in the United States, and not fair to such a responsible employer as Dillards.

Counsel asserted there should be no violation at Citation 1, Item 1, regarding the uncovered electrical boxes. He admitted the box was not "covered" up but it did not demonstrate any serious hazard. The wires were not "sticking out" nor was copper exposed but rather wire nuts protected anyone coming into contact from shock, injury or electrocution. Counsel referenced page 44 at Exhibit 1 on the definition of a serious violation asserting it means there must be a "most likely" causal factor for death and that was not remotely possible due to the covered wire nuts. So at best, if there was a violation, it should be reclassified as "other than serious".

Complainant counsel challenged the respondent's closing argument statements as to the page 101 definition for classification of goods carried for sale. She referenced the document at Exhibit 4 in evidence and asserted it correctly provides the company need not be shown to ". . . sell apparel and only major household appliances but rather apparel and either major household appliances or other home furnishings . . . ". Counsel asserted the complainant evidence was unrebutted, and included manager Walker's testimony that Dillards sells "home furnishings as well as apparel" therefore exemption cannot be lawfully

applied.

In reviewing the facts, testimony, exhibits and arguments of counsel, the Board is required to measure same against the established applicable law developed under the Occupational Safety and Health Act as adopted in the State of Nevada.

N.A.C. 618.788(1) provides:

In all proceedings commenced by the filing of a notice of contest, the **burden of proof** rests with the Administrator.

All facts forming the basis of a complaint must be **proved by a preponderance** of the evidence. See Armor Elevator Co., 1 OSHC 1409, 1973-1974 OSHD \P 16,958 (1973).

To prove a violation of a standard, the Secretary must establish (1) the applicability of the standard, (2) the existence of noncomplying conditions, (3) employee exposure or access, and (4) that the employer knew or with the exercise of reasonable diligence could have known of the violative condition. See Belger Cartage Service, Inc., 79 OSAHRC 16/B4, 7 BNA OSHC 1233, 1235, 1979 CCH OSHD \$\mathbb{T}23,400, p.28,373 (No. 76-1948, 1979); Harvey Workover, Inc., 79 OSAHRC 72/D5, 7 BNA OSHC 1687, 1688-90, 1979 CCH OSHD 23,830, pp. 28,908-10 (No. 76-1408, 1979); American Wrecking Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 351 F.3d 1254, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

A respondent may rebut allegations by showing:

- The standard was inapplicable to the situation at issue;
- 2. The situation was in compliance; or lack of access to a hazard. See Anning-Johnson Co., 4 OSHC 1193, 1975-1976 OSHD \P 20,690 (1976).

A "serious" violation defined in NRS 618.625(2) provides in pertinent part:

". . . a **serious** violation exists in a place of employment if there is a substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result from a condition which exists or from one or more practices, means, methods, operations or processes which have been adopted or are **in use at that place**

of employment unless the employer did not and could not, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, know the presence of the violation." (Emphasis added)

An "other than serious" violation is defined as:

If a direct or immediate relationship does exist but there is still no probability of death or serious physical injury, then an "other-thanserious" designation is appropriate. Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 18 O.S.H. Cases 1791 (1999). (emphasis added)

A "de minimis" violation is defined as:

"Where no direct or immediate relationship between the violative condition and occupational health or safety, the citation should be re-designated as a de minimis violation without penalty. Chao v. Symms Fruit Ranch, Inc., 242 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2001). Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Donovan, 659 F.2d 1285, 10 OSH Cases 1070 (5th Cir. 1981) (fiberglass itch). Rabinowitz, Occupational Safety and Health Law, 3rd Ed. 2013 at p. 263 (emphasis added)

A "minor" violation is established upon a preponderance of evidence in accordance with NRS 618.645.

NRS 618.465 provides in pertinent part:

"... The Administrator may prescribe procedures for the issuance of a notice in lieu of a citation with respect to: (a) **Minor violations** which have no direct or immediate relationship to safety or health; ... " (emphasis added)

At Citation 1, Item 1, the Board finds preponderant evidence to meet the burden of proof of violation, the serious classification, and appropriateness of the proposed penalty. In reviewing the elements of proof required, it was unrefuted the standard cited for the uncovered electrical boxes was applicable to the subject facts observed, testified and photographed in evidence. The non-complying conditions were proved through the photographic exhibits and unrebutted witness testimony of CSHO White. See photographic Exhibit 1 at page 66B.

Employee exposure was established by the preponderant evidence through the rule of access.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Under Occupational Safety and Health Law, there need be no showing of actual exposure in favor of access based upon reasonable predictability - (1) the zone of danger to be determined by the hazard; (2) access to mean that employees either while in the course of assigned duties, personal comfort activities on the job, or while in the normal course of ingress-egress will be, are, or have been in the zone of danger; and (3) the employer knew or could have known of its employees' presence so it could have warned the employees or prevented them from entering the zone of danger. Gilles & Cotting, Inc., 3 OSHC 2002, 1975-1976 OSHD ¶ 20,448 (1976); Cornell & Company, Inc., 5 OSHC 1736, 1977-1978 OSHD ¶ 22,095 (1977); Brennan v. OSAHRC and Alesea Lumber Co., 511 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1975); General Electric Company v. OSAHRC and Usery, 540 F.2d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1976). (emphasis added)

Employer knowledge was established based upon the cited item violation occurring within the plain view of the employer supervisory employee, and presumed known by imputation as supported by the unit manager statements to CSHO White. Occupational safety and health law recognizes satisfaction of the employer knowledge proof element based upon direct knowledge, supervisory employee knowledge, or constructively through principles of foreseeability and presumption of reasonable diligence.

Actual knowledge is not required for a finding of serious violation. Foreseeability preventability render a violation serious provided that a reasonably prudent employer, i.e., one who is safety conscious and possesses the technical expertise normally expected in the industry concerned, would know of the danger. Candler-Rusche, Inc., 4 OSHC 1232, 1976-1977 OSHD ¶ 20,723 (1976), appeal filed, No. 76-1645 (D.C. Cir. July 16, 1976); Packwoll International 2 OSWC 1712 16, 1976); Rockwell International, 2 OSHC 1710, 1973-1974 OSHD ¶ 16,960 (1973), aff'd, 540 F.2d 1283 (6th Cir. 1976); Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 1 OSHC 1077, 1971-1973 OSHD $\hat{\mathbb{I}}$ 15,365 (1973).

Division of Occupational Safety and Health vs. Pabco Gypsum, 105 Nev. 371, 775 P.2d 701 (1989).

3

4

5

6

1

2

The Board finds preponderant evidence to establish the violative conditions alleged at Citation 2, Items 1 and 2, but insufficient proof to confirm the OSHA classification of the violation as "other than serious" and appropriateness of the proposed penalties.

7 8

10 11

9

12 13

14

1516

17

18 19

20

2122

2324

2526

27 28

The documentary and testimonial evidence demonstrates the SIC designation of the Henderson Dillards as a department store was factually correct, appropriate and supported findings of violative conditions under the cited standards. The testimony of both complainant and respondent witnesses supported the simple plain meaning of the definition to prove Dillards carried, in addition to men's and women's apparel, "other home furnishings". The plain reading of the terms at Exhibit 4, page 101, provides for the classification of a retail business as a department store requiring "these stores must carry men's and women's apparel and either major household appliances or other home furnishings." The evidence is clear and convincing that respondent, regardless of the percentage of the specific goods held for sale in the various categories, carried the type of merchandise as identified to support the classification and SIC code of "department store". was additional corroborating evidence from the Clark County Business License authority and other documentation, however the direct evidence alone was unrefuted and supports the definition and the appropriate classification.

The troublesome aspect of the facts presented for consideration by the review board as an appellate body, is the enforcement action which resulted in the issuance of citations classified as "other than serious" for record keeping violations and assessment of substantial monetary penalties.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The evidence is uncontroverted that for an extended period of time the Dillards Henderson store carried a consistently similar line of merchandise but was considered by OSHA as an apparel rather than apparel designation keyed the This department store. classification used for risk analysis as well as OSHA record keeping and The interpretations initially made and reporting requirements. continued by the OSHA enforcement section for many years permitted an exemption from compliance by considering the store as an "apparel" That status was last reviewed and maintained on October 24, business. 2013 based upon the unrebutted evidence in the record showing the email exchanges between safety representative Garland and Nevada OSHA However, according to the testimony of CSHO White, the management. enforcement policy and practices of OSHA changed. The subject citations resulted after reinterpretation of the code classification removing the exemption status and treating the violative conditions for enforcement as an "other than serious" violation.

The respondent claims it had no "notice" of the change. CSHO White admitted in his testimony that it was not the obligation of the OSHA enforcement section to remind or inform employers of changes in the law, nor interpretations of enforcement policies. He correctly testified that employers in the state of Nevada are expected to be responsible, prudent and aware of the law and any changes. However application of the enforcement change under the particular facts in evidence portrays an unfair result. Any bonafide Nevada employer would want to avoid violations on its record and endure a variety of reporting requirements when it was doing exactly what it had done previously before the reinterpretation of enforcement practice and policy.

The Board has previously adjusted unfair results through application of OSHA law where a reasonable basis or cause has been demonstrated and no employee exposure to injury or hazards, even though there may be "technical" violations of particular standards or regulations. Here there was no evidence as to the Citation 2, Item 1 and 2 violations involved any employee harm, danger, or exposure to injurious hazards. Rather the subject violations were regulatory in nature and involved record keeping.

The respondent is on **notice** that it must comply with the current interpretation and/or any changes in the applicable law or procedure by the OSHA enforcement section. It is not within the purview of this Board to alter future OSHA enforcement practices, however a fair application of the law here requires reclassification of the violations and adjustment of the penalties.

"Where no direct or immediate relationship between the violative condition and occupational health or safety, the citation should be re-designated as a de minimis violation without penalty. Chao v. Symms Fruit Ranch, Inc., 242 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2001).

A "minor" charge of violation is established upon a preponderance of evidence in accordance with NRS 618.645 and recognized applicable law.

NRS 618.465 provides in pertinent part:

". . . The Administrator may prescribe procedures for the issuance of a notice in lieu of a citation with respect to: (a) Minor violations which have no direct or immediate relationship to safety or health; . . . " (emphasis added)

The evidence is unrefuted that the logs referenced at Citation 2, Item 2, were furnished notwithstanding the asserted defensive position of the respondent, but beyond the **four hour** time period proscribed in

the record keeping standard. Accordingly, the essence of the protective nature of the records was not ignored by the respondent nor was it non-compliant with the spirit of the law. The records were kept, they were available, but simply not furnished in a timely fashion. This should not be the basis of an "other than serious" classification or a penalty but rather treated as **de minimis** and a "minor violation" based upon NRS 618.465. There was simply no direct or immediate relationship to safety or health.

At Citation 2, Item 1, again violation of the standard is for record keeping and technical in nature but with no direct or immediate relationship between the violative condition and occupational safety and health. It should be treated as **de minimis** and a minor violation in accordance with Nevada statute 618.465.

While notification of changes in enforcement policy is not an established threshold requirement or proof element under the cited standard nor the obligation of a CSHO assigned to inspections, fairness and even application of the law for a Nevada business and recognizing the primary directive of occupational safety and health law to protect employees are not served by a practice which could easily be handled under the existing law when the facts warrant. Here the evidence supports an inference that the employer was not a scofflaw or evasive but rather operating under a previous enforcement policy and practice with a reasonable expectancy and understanding of a defined exemption status.

Notwithstanding the Board's findings here with regard to the enforcement interpretations, it must be clear to the respondent and any other parties, that this decision is limited to the facts in evidence and does not result in an exemption or variance for any future

enforcement or compliance purposes. The respondent must be governed under the law as now enforced and is on fair and due notice.

Violations have . . . been characterized as de minimis where the likelihood of an accident was remote and any injuries would have been minor. The Commission also found inconsequential deviations from the from the standard's requirements to be de minimis. Hood Sailmakers, 6 OSH Cases 1206, 1208 (Rev. Comm'n 1977). The Commission's authority to characterize violations as de minimis in nature has generally been upheld. Chao v. Symms Fruit Ranch, Inc., 242 F.3d 894, 19 OSH Cases 1337 (9th Cir. 2001) (collecting cases). Bechtel Power Corp., 10 OSH Cases 2001, 2009 (Rev. Comm'n 1982); Alamo Store Fixtures, 6 OSH Cases 1150, 1151 (Rev. Comm'n 1977).

It is reasonable under the particular facts and evidence to find the violative conduct at Citation 2, Items 1 and 2 as de minimis, dismiss the "other" classification and reclassify same as **de minimis and** a **minor** regulatory infraction under NRS 618.465. The proposed penalties are dismissed.

The Federal courts recognize the exclusive authority of the Commission (Board) to assess or adjust penalties.

If an employer contests the Secretary's proposed penalty, the Review Commission has **exclusive** authority to assess the penalty, the Secretary's penalty is considered merely a proposal. Relying on the language of Section 17(j), the Commission and courts of appeal have consistently held that it is for the Commission to determine, **de novo**, the **appropriateness of the penalty** to be imposed for violation of the Act or an OSHA standard. (Emphasis added)

The Review Commission therefore is not bound by OSHA's penalty calculation guidelines. The Commission evaluates all circumstances.

"The Commission . . . may reduce or eliminate a penalty by changing the citation classification or by amending the citation . . .". See Reich v. OSCRC (Erie Coke Corp.), 998 F.2d 134, 16 OSH Cases 1241 (3d Cir. 1993) (emphasis added)

Based upon the evidence and testimony, it is the decision of the NEVADA OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW BOARD that a violation of Nevada Revised Statute did occur as to Citation 1, Item 1, 29 CFR 1910.305(b)(2)(i). The classification of "Serious" is appropriate and affirmed. The assessed is penalty is reasonable and confirmed in the amount of FOUR THOUSAND FIFTY DOLLARS (\$4,050.00).

The Board further finds, as a matter of fact and law, the cited respondent violative conduct under the particular facts and evidence at Citation 2, Item 1, 29 CFR 1904.32(a)(1) and Item 2, 29 CFR 1904.40(a) were de minimis and minor with no direct or immediate relationship to safety or health. The cited violations are confirmed but reclassified from "other than serious" to de minimis and minor as defined at NRS 618.465. The proposed penalties are denied.

The Board directs counsel for the Complainant, CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, DIVISION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, to submit proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the NEVADA OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW BOARD and serve copies on opposing counsel within twenty (20) days from date of decision. After five (5) days time for filing any objection, the final Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law shall be submitted to the NEVADA OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW BOARD by prevailing counsel. Service of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law signed by the Chairman of the NEVADA OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW BOARD shall constitute the Final Order of the BOARD.

DATED: This <u>17th</u> day of September 2014.

NEVADA OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW BOARD

By<u>/s/</u> JOE ADAMS, Chairman